

# Pareto-Rational Verification

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Joint work with

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# Outline

1. Background
2. Pareto-Rational Verification
3. Universal Pareto-Rational Verification
4. Our Results

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# Formal Verification

**Motivation:** ensure the correctness of systems responsible for **critical tasks**

Classical approach to **Formal Verification** (FV)

- **model of the system** to verify
- **model of the environment** in which it is executed
- **specification**  $\varphi$  to be enforced by the system


**Goal:** check if  $\varphi$  **satisfied in all executions** of the system in the environment

**Limitations:**

- check **single behavior** of the system
- against **potentially irrational behaviors** of environment

## Games: Arenas, Plays and Objectives

**Game Arena:** tuple  $G = (V, V_0, V_1, E, v_0)$  with  $(V, E)$  a directed graph




**Play:** infinite path starting with the **initial vertex**  $v_0$ ,  $\rho = v_0 v_2 (v_3 v_5)^\omega$

**Objective**  $\Omega_i$  for Player  $i \in \{0, 1\}$ :

- subset of plays,  $\rho$  **satisfies**  $\Omega_i$  if  $\rho \in \Omega_i$
- **parity:** plays whose **minimum priority** seen infinitely often is **even**

# Games: Strategies and Consistency

**Finite-memory strategy**  $\sigma_i: V^* \times V_i \rightarrow V$  dictates the choices of Player  $i$   
 $\rightarrow$  given  $\underbrace{v_0 v_1 \dots}_{h} \underbrace{v_k}_{\in V_i}$  yields  $v_{k+1}$  using a **deterministic Moore machine**  $\mathcal{M}$



A play is **consistent** with  $\sigma_i$  if  $v_{k+1} = \sigma_i(v_0 \dots v_k) \forall k \in \mathbb{N}, \forall v_k \in V_i$

Consider the **set of plays consistent** with a strategy  $\sigma_0$

$\rightarrow \text{Plays}_{\sigma_0} = \{v_0 v_1^\omega, v_0 v_2 v_4^\omega, v_0 v_2 v_3 v_5 v_6^\omega, v_0 v_2 v_3 v_5 v_3 v_7^\omega\}$

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# The Model

**Stackelberg-Pareto game** (SP game) [BRT21]:  $\mathcal{G} = (G, \Omega_0, \Omega_1, \dots, \Omega_t)$

- Player 0 (system): objective  $\Omega_0$
- Player 1 (environment): **several objectives**  $\Omega_1, \dots, \Omega_t$  (components)
- **Non-zero-sum**: multi-component environment with its own objectives


**Payoff** of  $\rho$  for Player 1 is the **vector of Booleans**  $\text{pay}(\rho) \in \{0, 1\}^t$

- **order**  $\leq$  on payoffs, e.g.,  $(0, 1, 0) < (0, 1, 1)$

$$\Omega_1 = \text{Inf}(\{v_6\})$$

$$\Omega_2 = \text{Inf}(\{v_3\})$$


$$\Omega_3 = \text{Inf}(\{v_7\})$$





## Pareto-Optimal Payoffs


1. Player 0 **provides**  $\mathcal{M}$  encoding his strategy  $\sigma_0$  (that we want to verify)
2. Player 1 **considers**  $\text{Plays}_{\sigma_0}$ 
  - corresponding **set of payoffs**  $\{\text{pay}(\rho) \mid \rho \in \text{Plays}_{\sigma_0}\}$
  - identify **Pareto-optimal** (PO) payoffs (maximal w.r.t.  $\leq$ ) : set  $P_{\sigma_0}$



## Pareto-Rational Verification problem (PRV problem)


Given a deterministic Moore machine  $\mathcal{M}$  encoding a strategy  $\sigma_0$ , verify if every play  $\rho \in \text{Plays}_{\sigma_0}$  with  $\text{pay}(\rho) \in P_{\sigma_0}$  is such that  $\rho \in \Omega_0$

Environment is **rational** and responds to  $\sigma_0$  **to get a Pareto-optimal payoff**  
 → Verify that  $\sigma_0$  **satisfies**  $\Omega_0$  in every such **rational response**




## Example of the PRV Problem

### Moore machine $\mathcal{M}$



### SP game $\mathcal{G}$



- $\text{Plays}_{\sigma_0} = \{ v_0 v_1^\omega, v_0 v_2 v_4^\omega, v_0 v_2 v_3 v_5 v_6^\omega, v_0 v_2 v_3 v_5 v_3 v_7^\omega \}$
- $\text{payoffs} = \{ (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0) \}$
- $P_{\sigma_0} = \{ (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1) \}$

→ together  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{G}$  form a **positive instance** to the PRV problem


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## Specifying Multiple Strategies

**Nondeterministic Moore machine:** lift determinism of next-move function

→ given  $\underbrace{v_0 v_1 \dots v_k}_h \underbrace{v_{k+1}}_{\in V_i}$  yields  $v_{k+1}$  from a **set of possible successors**



The machine  $\mathcal{M}$  **embeds** a (possibly infinite) **set of strategies**  $[\mathcal{M}]$


- $\sigma_0^k, k \geq 1$  such that  $\sigma_0^k(hv_3) = v_5, \sigma_0^k(v_0v_2(v_3v_5)^k v_3) = v_7$
- $\sigma_0$  such that  $\sigma_0(v_3) = v_5$

**Different from determinizing** by selecting a single successor

## Universal Pareto-Rational Verification problem (UPRV problem)


Given a nondeterministic Moore machine  $\mathcal{M}$ , verify if for all strategies  $\sigma_0 \in \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket$ , every play  $\rho \in \text{Plays}_{\sigma_0}$  with  $\text{pay}(\rho) \in P_{\sigma_0}$  is such that  $\rho \in \Omega_0$

**Generalization** of the PRV problem to **multiple strategies**




## Example of the UPRV Problem

### Moore machine $\mathcal{M}$



### SP game $\mathcal{G}$



- $\text{Plays}_{\sigma_0} = \{ v_0 v_1^\omega, v_0 v_2 v_4^\omega, v_0 v_2 (v_3 v_5)^* v_6^\omega, v_0 v_2 (v_3 v_5)^\omega \}$
- $\text{payoffs} = \{ (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0) \}$
- $P_{\sigma_0} = \{ (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1) \}$

→ together  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{G}$  form a **negative instance** to the UPRV problem

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# Complexity Results

Study both problems for **parity**, **Boolean Büchi**, and **LTL** objectives

## PRV Problem

Objective	Complexity class
Parity	co-NP-complete
Boolean Büchi	$\Pi_2$ P-complete
LTL	PSPACE-complete


## UPRV Problem

Objective	Complexity class
Parity	PSPACE, NP-hard, co-NP-hard
Boolean Büchi	PSPACE-complete
LTL	2EXPTIME-complete



# The Reduction: Objectives

	$\Omega_0$	$\Omega_1$	$\Omega_{x_1}$	$\Omega_{\neg x_1}$	...	$\Omega_{x_m}$	$\Omega_{\neg x_m}$	$(\Omega_{\ell^{1,1}}$	$\Omega_{\ell^{1,2}}$	$\Omega_{\ell^{1,3}}$	...	$(\Omega_{\ell^{r,1}}$	$\Omega_{\ell^{r,2}}$	$\Omega_{\ell^{r,3}}$
$G_1$	0	0	1	0	...	0	1	0	0	0	...	1	1	0
$S_1$	1	1	1	0	...	0	1	0	0	0	...	1	1	1
$S_r$	1	1	1	0	...	0	1	1	1	1	...	0	0	0



# Fixed-Parameter Complexity

## PRV and UPRV problem

Both problems are fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) for parity and Boolean Büchi with various parameters

**Sound:** in practice, we can assume those parameters to have **small values**

**Additional Algorithm:** based on **counterexamples**

→ **implemented and compared** using **toy example** and random instances

# Thank you!

# Bibliography I

- [BRT21] Véronique Bruyère, Jean-François Raskin, and Clément Tamines.  
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In Serge Haddad and Daniele Varacca, editors, *32nd International Conference on Concurrency Theory, CONCUR 2021, August 24-27, 2021, Virtual Conference*, volume 203 of *LIPICs*, pages 27:1–27:17. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2021.
- [DF12] R.G. Downey and M.R. Fellows.  
*Parameterized Complexity.*  
Monographs in Computer Science. Springer New York, 2012.
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*Computational complexity.*  
Addison-Wesley, 1994.

## Fixed-Parameter Complexity [DF12]

A problem is **fixed-parameter tractable** (FPT) for parameter  $k$  if there exists a solution running in  $f(k) \times n^{\mathcal{O}(1)}$  where  $f$  is a function of  $k$  independent of  $n$

Example: solving a problem is polynomial in input size, **exponential in  $k$**   
→ solving the problem is fixed-parameter tractable (easy if fix a small  $k$ )

### PRV and UPRV problem

Both problems are fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) for parity and Boolean Büchi with various parameters

**Sound:** in practice, we can assume those parameters to have **small values**